Killing Them Softly: Mediations on a Painful Punishment of Death by Blecker, Robert
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 35 | Number 4 Article 11
2008
Killing Them Softly: Mediations on a Painful
Punishment of Death
Robert Blecker
New York Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Blecker, Killing Them Softly: Mediations on a Painful Punishment of Death, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 969 (2008).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol35/iss4/11
KILLING THEM SOFTLY:
MEDITATIONS ON A PAINFUL
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH
Robert Blecker*
THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY: A FRAGMENT
Controversy continues to swirl around lethal injection. Oppo-
nents emphasize the real risk of ill-trained corrections personnel
botching executions and turning capital punishment into official
rituals of torture-inhumane and unconstitutional. Worse,
pancuronium, a paralytic agent, masks the real agony of the con-
demned who appears to die in peace without pain. Supporters
counter that although some risk of unintended pain remains, when
administered properly by physicians or other trained personnel, le-
thal injection produces a quick, painless, and constitutional death.
A de facto national moratorium on executions occurred while
the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of lethal injec-
tion in Baze v. Rees.' Of course, many opponents of lethal injec-
tion simply detest the death penalty itself, however administered
seizing on the remote but real possibility of a state-administered,
painful execution to oppose lethal injection, and every other
method as unconstitutionally "cruel and unusual punishment."'2
Others reject the death penalty, fearing that states will execute the
innocent or be spurred by racist motives. Some admit that mon-
sters may deserve a painful death, if only the government could be
trusted to determine who and how. Still others, while opposing the
death penalty itself, may recognize that rightful punishment must
be painful in order to be punishment.
Some critics point out, however, that people are largely driven to
destructive acts by forces outside their control or beyond their re-
sponsibility. Public safety may require us to incapacitate, and
those confined may feel uncomfortable. But, they insist, we always
punish most reluctantly, and treat civilly those who threaten us un-
til we can cure or rehabilitate and then release them, all this time
* Robert Blecker is Professor of Law at New York Law School. Edward Carly,
Dr. Mark Heath, and Michelle Witten provided thoughtful critiques. Ms. Witten and
Bradley Gottfried assisted with research.
1. Ed Stoddard, Execution "Moratorium" Takes Hold, REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2007.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
striving with compassion to ease their suffering as much as possi-
ble. This camp generally acknowledges painful punishment as an
unpleasant necessity, but urges us to make it as painless as practi-
cal. At one extreme, psychiatrist Karl Menninger, in The Crime of
Punishment, acknowledging that punishment requires intentionally
inflicting pain, famously called upon society to abandon punish-
ment entirely.'
At the other extreme, the most indiscriminately vindictive call
for revenge, angrily demanding that the state kill all murderers,
and do it painfully. Other death penalty supporters, however, in-
sist that only the "worst of the worst of the worst"-brutal and
sadistic mass-murdering rapists, for example-deserve to die.
Death penalty supporters, following Immanuel Kant, demand a
mostly painless execution process, insisting that simply killing the
condemned balances the scales.4 These retributivists may derive
satisfaction from imagining (however contrary to fact) the con-
demned suffering every day for years on death row, remorseful for
his murder, haunted by ever-pressing thoughts that one day state
agents will kill him prematurely. They may believe this drawn-out,
anguished death-wait requires no additional pain in the dying pro-
cess. Others, however insist that the most brutal and vicious killers
deserve to experience physical pain while they die.
Almost everyone accepts that imprisonment should be psycho-
logically and physically unpleasant. When it comes to capital pun-
ishment, however, as the Supreme Court consistently declares in
the modern era, seemingly death is different.' Deeper reflection,
and two decades documenting daily life inside prisons and on death
rows in four states, however, convinces me otherwise. Our wide-
3. KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 201-07 (The Viking Press
1968) (1966). "The principle of no punishment cannot allow of any exception; it must
apply in every case, even the worst case, the most horrible case, the most dreadful
case, not merely in the accidental, sympathy-arousing case." Id. at 207; see also id. at
260-62 (calling for society to substitute the "therapeutic attitude" for the "punitive
attitude").
4. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 139 § 333 (John
Ladd, trans., Hackett Publishing 2d ed. 1999) (1797).
5. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-89 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("[d]eath is a unique punishment;" "[d]eath ... is in a class by itself'); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("[P]enalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind."); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "penalty of death is different in kind
from any other punishment" and emphasizing its "uniqueness"); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[P]enalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long."); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977).
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spread revulsion at painful executions and the rising demand for a
guaranteed painless death penalty is but the most visible part of a
deeper disavowal of pain, and therefore punishment itself.
Difficult questions of pain and punishment can divide us starkly
or subtly, but mostly they lay unexposed, unexplored, overlooked,
and overshadowed in the death penalty debate itself. But then the
Court commanded us in Baze to put aside the question of capital
punishment per se, and focus instead upon the constitutional limits
of painful punishment. Thus, we take as given that the state may
execute some people, and ask instead, how shall we kill them?
How should it feel to die?
Earlier eras and other cultures in the bloodthirsty history of hu-
mankind have indulged in mass torture, mindless vengeance, and
boundless, misdirected, collective hatred. In the United States to-
day, however, reacting officially to individual child killers or serial
rapist murderers, "it is now far more likely that people should wit-
ness acts of grievous cruelty ... with too little hatred and too little
desire for deliberate measured revenge than that they should feel
too much."6
We must no longer haphazardly employ execution methods that
seem indifferent to the experience of dying, attempting to obliter-
ate from memory the agonizing death of the victim which gives us
the right, if not the obligation, to execute the aggravated murderer.
Whether or not we examine it carefully or declare it openly, most
of us assume that simply killing the condemned balances the scales
by inflicting enough pain. Can we not soberly ask ourselves
whether, in certain cases, death alone is enough?
Punishing by torture violates human dignity and the Constitution
rightly forbids it. But, by fully rejecting all pain in punishment, we
abandon punishment itself. The time has come to humanize the
punishment of death-not by abolishing it, nor bureaucratizing it
and shamefully laying responsibility elsewhere, but by infusing it
with concern and emotional denunciation.
I. "PUNISHMENT" MUST BE PAINFUL
From the beginning, as defined and experienced, etymologically
and existentially, "punishment" and "pain" have been inseparably
connected. The very word "pain" comes from the ancient Greek
poine, the Latin poena meaning penalty, or punishment.7 As a
6. 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF EN-
GLAND 82 (McMillan & Co. 1883).
7. See, e.g., MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 835 (10th ed. 2001).
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noun, "punishment" means "suffering, pain, or loss that serves as
retribution."8 H.L.A. Hart lists pain as the first of five elements
that constitute "the standard or central case of punishment."9 Our
commonsense notion of punishment reflects this: punishment in-
volves intense physical and/or psychological discomfort. Whether
the condemned feel their pain physically or psychologically, their
punishment, to be punishment, must and should be painful.
"All punishment in itself is evil," Jeremy Bentham declared, pre-
cisely because it is painful. "It ought only to be admitted in as far
as it promises to exclude some greater evil." 10 For the utilitarian,
pleasure is good; pain is evil, plain and simple. Accordingly, soci-
ety rationally only inflicts pain to prevent greater pain, by deterring
others, incapacitating or reforming the dangerous offender, all for
the public good. Therefore, utilitarians firmly believe society must
never inflict pain for the sake of the past. Dead victims cannot be
brought to life; they are beyond all feeling.
"The end of punishment, therefore, is no other, than to prevent
others from committing the like offense," declared Cesare Bec-
caria.11 An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, first published in
1769 in Britain and 1773 in America,12 set the perspective of
America's founding generation on punishment. "Such punish-
ments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be
chosen, as will make strongest and most lasting impressions on the
minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the
criminal."13
Beccaria resolutely rejected the death penalty. His Essay re-
mains the greatest abolitionist tract ever written in the West. But
while rejecting all gratuitous pain and suffering, Beccaria held that
we ought to consciously inflict painful bodily punishments upon
criminals who have intentionally and gratuitously hurt their vic-
tims. "When robbery is attended with violence ... corporal pun-
ishment should be added to slavery."14 Thus Beccaria, too,
8. Id. at 947.
9. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 4 (1968).
10. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 158 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. 1996) (1789).
11. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 51-52 (1788).
12. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 6 (Adolph
Caso ed., Intl Pocket Lib. 1992).
13. See BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 51.
14. Id. at 87.
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embraced non-lethal but physically painful punishment calibrated
to produce the best effects.
Retributivists reject utilitarianism. We make covenants with the
past, feeling obliged to respond on behalf of the dead victim. Ret-
ribution persists as punishment's essential measure, justification,
and limit. Naturally grateful, we reward those who bring us plea-
sure. Instinctively resentful, we punish those who cause us pain.
Retributively, society intentionally inflicts pain and suffering on
criminals because they deserve it, but only to the extent they de-
serve it.
The basic retributive measure of pain-like for like-"as he hath
done, so shall it be done to him,"15 "giving a person a taste of her
own medicine; fighting fire with fire"' 6 primally satisfies. Beccaria,
as well, called for like-kind punishment as a response to crime.
17
Having the punishment resemble the crime better deters would-be
criminals by creating this association of ideas. Retributivists, how-
ever, would connect the criminal's attitude while committing a
crime along with the suffering victim's experience to that criminal's
later painful experience of punishment. In short, for the sake of
justice, we would connect crime to punishment.
Critics commonly equate retribution with revenge-disparaging
"an eye for an eye" as barbaric. But retribution is not simply re-
venge. When a regime decimates a family or community for the
despicable acts of a single member, they exact revenge, but hardly
respond with retributive justice. Revenge may be limitless, much
more than deserved, even misdirected at the undeserving. Retribu-
tion, a painful measure, however, must be limited and in its more
mature measurement, proportional-no more (or less) than de-
served. The Biblical "eye for an eye," originally understood as no
more than an eye for an eye, exemplifies retribution as a restriction
on pain as much as justification of punishment.
Thus, we reject even a painless execution for simple robbery, no
matter how effectively it might deter other would-be robbers, in-
sisting it would be cruel and wildly disproportionate to the moral
gravity of that crime. Similarly, we might also insist that a painless
death for a mass-murdering rapist child killer, so much less than
deserved and thereby inhumane, would again be wildly dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of the crime.
15. Leviticus 24:19.
16. Colloquial.
17. BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 87.
9732008]
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Collectively, then, retributivists disregard punishment's future
costs or benefits, resting justice-limited, proportional punish-
ment-exclusively on a criminal's past moral culpability. They dis-
miss the cry of contemporary utilitarians who declare it "irrational"
to cry over spilt blood and rebut the challenge that certain punish-
ments are pointless-"what good will it do to inflict more pain"-
as beside the point. Justice, a moral imperative in itself, requires
deserved punishment. And punishment requires pain.
How the past matters fundamentally divides utilitarians from re-
tributivists to this day. Together, however, we all oppose gratui-
tous pain and suffering-whether because it's inefficacious or
undeserved.
II. THE MODERN TRANSFORMATION OF PAINFUL PUNISHMENT
Although the Old Testament explicitly calls for painful execution
by stoning and burning, an amicus brief by the American Associa-
tion of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists submitted to the Supreme Court
in Baze insisted that the Talmud commits the authorities to the
least painful and most certain execution possible:
2000 years ago the rabbis of the Talmud agreed that notwith-
standing the apparent literal meaning of the Biblical text, execu-
tion must be carried out as painlessly as possible. The relevant
passages from the Talmud demonstrate that the rabbis sought-
with the scientific knowledge and means available to them in
their time-to formulate the quickest, least painful, and least
disfiguring methods of execution that the technology of the day
would allow within the framework of Biblical texts.18
The amicus further assured the Court that this Judeo-Christian
tradition "known to the Framers of the Constitution and to the
draftsmen of the Eighth Amendment,"'19 supports an originalist, as
well as contemporary, rejection of all execution methods that un-
necessarily risk avoidable pain.
Unfortunately, the authors of the brief cherry-picked their
sources, ignoring passages that clearly rebutted this claim. Tractate
Sanhedrin 81a states that "[h]e who incurs two death penalties im-
posed by Beth Din [the Court] is executed by the severer. If he
committed one sin for which a twofold death penalty is incurred,
18. Brief for American Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists ("AAJLJ") as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259
(U.S. Apr. 16, 2008).
19. Id. at 3-4.
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he is executed by the severer .... ",20 Tractate Sanhedrin 49b states
that "[s]toning is severer than burning, since thus the blasphemer
and the idol-worshipper are executed."'2
Plainly, contrary to the amicus brief, the Talmud repeatedly calls
for executions deservedly more painful than necessary, and far
from "virtually certain" to be "instantaneous. ' 22 True, scholars in-
terpreting Biblical text two thousand years ago did reject even
more painful drawn-out tortuous deaths-whether by burning
flame, or pelting small stones, and the rabbis did derive limits to
how much the condemned should suffer from the Biblical com-
mandment "[y]ou shalt love thy neighbor as yourself."23 But while
the Talmud limits bodily pain, it hardly eliminates all technologi-
cally avoidable physical pain and suffering. The authors under-
stood the difference in suffering among execution methods, and
deemed more painful methods to be more appropriate in some
cases. This not only refutes the amicus brief's thesis, as a measure
of punishment, it embraces retribution while rejecting the dispro-
portionality of crude revenge.
Only relatively recently, in the past few centuries, did punish-
ment morph into something which denies its own nature. The En-
lightenment celebrated the pursuit of personal liberty as life's
central purpose. How rational, then, to calibrate punishment-not
by inflicting physically painful sensations, but instead by depriving
a person of liberty, matching units of time spent in prison to the
seriousness of crime. Foucault clearly saw this: "[o]ne no longer
touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then only to
reach something other than the body itself."
2 4
Colonial Americans participated in this transformation. Contin-
uing traditions from Jewish, Roman, and English law, Americans at
first adopted different execution procedures to correspond to more
or less serious capital crimes. "The aggravated death sentence for
particularly egregious murder," Stewart Banner informs us, "was
to gibbet the body: leave it suspended in chains in an iron cage
where the birds could pick at it."' 25 In the very worst cases of mur-
der during the nineteenth century, the body of the condemned
20. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 81a 537 (Soncino ed., 1961).
21. Id. at 49b 332.
22. See Brief for AAJLJ, supra note 18, at 9.
23. Leviticus 19:18.
24. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 11 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979).
25. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 74 (2002).
2008]
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
would be dissected, thus "signifying that some murderers deserved
a greater punishment than others. 2 6
James Madison declared to the first Congress, "[w]e ought to
proportion the terror of punishment to the degree of the offense,"
supporting dissection, while rejecting torture by proposing the
Eighth Amendment.27 Capital punishment, then, was "a spectrum
of penalties"-some more psychologically painful in contemplation
than others-"providing government officials with gradations of
severity above and below ordinary execution. 28
In the early decades of the new republic, progressive Americans
embraced a new approach to punishment, "based on the conviction
that crime was more like disease than like sin."'29 Scientific deter-
minism challenged free will along with the retributive basis for
punishment.3" Treatment replaced punishment as the enlightened
response to crime.3" The nineteenth century saw a rising middle
class with a new "aversion to the sight of death. Disease and dying
moved away from the homes into hospitals. Cemeteries moved
away from urban areas to garden-like spots far from living peo-
ple."'32 Only the "vulgar mob" enjoyed watching the infliction of
pain.33
The invention of anesthesia in the nineteenth century recast pain
itself as largely avoidable.34 New technologies emerged, allowing
the state to adapt therapeutic methods, such as electric baths, into
painless instruments for killing.35 Electrocution and gas replaced
hanging, by and large to avoid pain.36 Then, lethal injection re-
placed them both, to end all pain, even in the punishment of death.
Executions became more mechanical, more impersonal, trans-
formed into hidden, professionally administered events "in small
indoor spaces in remote state prisons. '37
At every opportunity we banish pain from our sight; we profes-
sionalize and bureaucratize its infliction in private settings. Pain,
26. See id. at 78.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 86.
29. See id. at 120.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 120-21.
32. Id. at 153.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 170.
35. Id. at 178.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 207.
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and with it punishment itself, became an abstraction; its intentional
infliction is a sight and act to be avoided, a source of shame.
With the decline of public executions (and lesser punishments),
and the rise of prisons run by professional bureaucrats, punishment
"become[s] the most hidden part of the penal process," Foucault
observed. 38 "[I]t leaves the domain of more or less everyday per-
ception and enters that of abstract consciousness. 39 Of course, ini-
tially, with harsh prison conditions and enforced isolation, neither
society nor the prisoner could clearly distinguish physical from psy-
chological pain. But, in the modern era of the bureaucratic prison,
with corrections officers whose official mission was safety and se-
curity but not punishment, as Foucault sums it up, "[p]hysical pain,
the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of
the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations punish-
ment has become an economy of suspended rights."40 These days,
inside prisons, punishment has become largely the economy of sus-
pended privileges.
The legal culture seems to accept this evolution as necessary and
inevitable, but it could have been, and it still can be, otherwise.
III. BAZE v. REES: ORAL ARGUMENT OR AGREEMENT?
While opponents constitutionally challenged almost every aspect
of capital punishment during the past several decades, more than a
century had passed since the U.S. Supreme Court last specifically
confronted the constitutional issue of death as painful punishment.
With a moratorium restraining states from executing anyone, and
all parties commanded not to question the constitutionality of the
death penalty itself,41 the Supreme Court finally seemed ready to
discuss the issue of painful punishment.
During oral arguments in Baze, counsel and the Justices some-
times disagreed about the constitutionally permissible risks of a
painful death. Other times, they argued about the Constitutional
appearance of a painful death. Or, they sparred over the constitu-
tional right to inflict an unintended but unnecessarily painful
death. Whether intentionally, apparently, or probably-the pun-
ishment of painful death for once seemed to have grabbed the
Court's attention.
38. See FOUCAULT, supra note 24, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 11.
41. See Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008).
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During oral arguments, however, everybody assumed without
discussion that less painful punishment becomes, thereby, more hu-
mane. Can punishment be so inadequate as to fail the victims, or
their surviving loved ones? Can a painless death be inhumane,
precisely because it was painless? Sometimes we can better under-
stand an era by focusing less on its leading controversies and more
by unearthing in its silence deeply embedded assumptions that no
leader thought to challenge.
In Baze, what nobody argued most reveals the deeper signifi-
cance of the oral argument. Although everybody consciously as-
sumed that capital punishment itself was constitutional, obscured
from consciousness, without discussion or contention, everybody
also assumed that no state would intentionally inflict a painful
death. Counsel for the condemned, the State, the United States,
and the Supreme Court Justices themselves-all seemed to take it
as given that wherever practical, human dignity always supports
the least painful punishment.
Chief Justice Roberts questioned Donald Verilli, counsel for the
condemned, "I thought your expert agreed that if the two grams of
sodium pentothal is properly administered . . . in virtually every
case there would be a humane death."42 Counsel readily concurred
with the Chief Justice-a massive dose of barbiturate properly ad-
ministered would ensure a painless and therefore humane punish-
ment of death.4 3 "It seems to me that it couldn't be cruel and
unusual punishment, because there is no pain." Arguing later for
a lethal dose of anesthetic alone with no paralytic agent or heart-
stopping lethal potassium, Verilli repeated, "if it doesn't cause pain
it can't be a cruel and unusual punishment. '4 5 The Chief Justice
during oral argument and again in his plurality opinion, simply
equated without discussion "painless" with "humane. '46
"Where does that come from, that you must find the method of
execution that causes the least pain? ' 47 protested Justice Scalia, to
the counsel for the condemned. "We have approved electrocution.
We have approved death by firing squad. . . . Where does this
42. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL
1733259 (Apr. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument].
43. See id. at 5.
44. Id. at 11-12.
45. Id. at 21.
46. "The firing squad, hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have each
in turn given way to more humane methods, culminating in today's consensus on le-
thal injection." Baze, 2008 WL 1733259, at *16.
47. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 21.
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come from, that in the . . .execution of a person who has been
convicted of killing people we must choose the least painful
method possible? 48
Justice Scalia had come close to surfacing the buried issue: could
a state today continue Biblical, Talmudic, Roman, English, and
American traditions by consciously selecting and calibrating a
method of painful execution? If only the Justice's righteous indig-
nation had moved him at that moment to ask the question slightly
differently: where does it come from that in the execution of a
person who has been convicted of killing people painfully, we must
choose the least painful method possible? Adding "painfully"
would have forced the retributive question by implication. May
the people respond to consciously inflicted physical pain with con-
sciously inflicted physical pain? While rejecting torture as the
Eighth Amendment commands, may we consciously, retributively
calibrate pain to respond as deserved? By omitting the word
"painfully," Scalia's question obscures the deepest retributive is-
sue, instead making it appear solely as a question of a state's right
to reject untried or inefficient-although-less-painful options.
The opportunity seemingly passed unnoticed, but later sparked
again with counsel insisting that preventing the risk of excruciating
pain from a botched execution would have been a "core concern of
the Eighth Amendment at the time of its ratification."4 9 "No, I
don't agree with that," Justice Scalia shot back. "The concern was
with torture, which is the intentional infliction of pain. . . . [T]he
three-quarters of the States that have the death penalty, all except
one of whom use this method of execution, they haven't set out to
inflict pain."5 And what if a state had consciously capitally pun-
ished, not penalized but punished the aggravated murderer with a
painful death? The question went unasked. Oral argument in
Baze turned into silent agreement. It takes a very sophisticated
fish to know that it's wet.
Unquestionably, the U.S. Constitution precludes deliberate tor-
ture as punishment. But torture is not, as Justice Scalia insisted,
simply "the intentional infliction of pain." The dictionary defines
"torture" as "the infliction of intense pain to punish, coerce, or af-
ford sadistic pleasure."'" As punishment, torture requires inten-
tional pain above a certain threshold, inflicted from a motive of
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 21-22.
51. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1246.
2008] 979
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revenge. As we have seen, retribution contrasts sharply with
revenge.
Thus, it simply begs the question to assert that intentionally in-
flicting severely painful punishment automatically becomes torture
and inhumane. Retributively deserved painful punishment, not
amounting to mere revenge, does not necessarily constitute tor-
ture. Torture may include the intentional infliction of pain, but so
does verbal insult, a slap in the face, prison, fines, punitive dam-
ages, and a host of other responses nobody would consider torture.
If punishment itself, by definition, essentially requires the inten-
tional infliction of pain, then according to Justice Scalia's broad
definition, all punishment is torture and unconstitutional.
Justice Scalia's apparent support for a state's right to adopt an
execution protocol risking painful death seemed to imply that they
may not impose it by design. States using lethal injection "haven't
set out to inflict pain," the Justice continued. "To the contrary,
they have introduced it presumably because they, indeed, think it's
a more humane way, although not one that is free of all risk." 52
Counsel for the condemned, however, countered that beyond a
certain probability threshold, the Constitution limited risking "un-
necessary pain."53 "No ... unnecessary and wanton," Justice Scalia
corrected, returning to motive. "[U]nnecessary and wanton inflic-
tion of pain."'54 The dictionary defines "wanton" as "immoral,
senseless, unjustifiable, recklessly disregardful of justice or de-
cency."'5 5 If Justice Scalia was correct, and only wanton unneces-
sary pain was prohibited, it would beg the question to characterize
all purposefully painful punishment as wanton. Such pain would
be intentionally but not recklessly inflicted, and would only be
wanton if it were unjustified.
This and other similar exchanges ended inconclusively with
counsel emphasizing the real risk of pain so excruciating to the
condemned as to amount to torture per se, separate from the
state's motive. 56 Scalia, the Justice who had nearly surfaced the
question by linking torture to penological motive, then buried it by
broadly defining "torture" as painful death intentionally inflicted,
while assuming that no state's current lethal injection protocol in-
tentionally inflicted such a painful death. Thus, their exchange col-
52. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 22.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id. at 22.
55. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1330.
56. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 24-25.
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lapsed upon unchallenged common ground that the Constitution
permitted a risk-free punishment of painless death, while it forbade
the intentional infliction of painful death.
A. Baze v. Rees
Three months after this joust, the Supreme Court finally decided
Baze v. Rees. The Court split, 7-2, permitting Kentucky, and other
states, to continue using a three-drug protocol, thereby risking and
masking an unintentionally painful execution.5 7 As in oral argu-
ment, the Justices never seemed to contemplate, much less discuss,
whether justice itself might sometimes actually require imposing a
painful death.
Justice Stevens alone, finally revealing himself as an abolitionist,
suggested that too little pain might undermine capital punishment's
retributive function, thus eliminating its "primary rationale" and
only possible constitutional justification.58 "[B]y requiring that an
execution be relatively painless, we necessarily protect the inmate
from enduring any punishment that is comparable to the suffering
inflicted on his victim,"59 he observed. "This trend, while appropri-
ate and required by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment, actually undermines the very premise on
which public approval of the retribution rationale is based. '60
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia struck back derisively:
The infliction of any pain, according to Justice Stevens, violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments, but so too does the imposition of capital punish-
ment without pain because a criminal penalty lacks a retributive
purpose unless it inflicts pain commensurate with the pain that
the criminal has caused. In other words, if a punishment is not
retributive enough, it is not retributive at all. To state this pro-
position is to refute it, as Justice Stevens once understood.
"[T]he decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate
sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's
belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront
to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty
of death. 61
57. Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008).
58. Id. at *24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Id. at *24.
61. Id. at *30 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184
(1974)).
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This classic quote from Gregg's plurality opinion, in which Jus-
tice Stevens concurred, does not really refute Justice Stevens, nor
does it fully engage the issue. If Gregg had declared that certain
crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the
only adequate response may be the penalty of a "painful" death,
then the contradiction would be unavoidable. But Justice Scalia
had a point: given the alternative-life in prison with its many
privileges, satisfactions, and reliefs-even a painless death might
more nearly approach true retribution, although neither a pain-free
death, nor a privileged prison life achieved real justice.
While Justice Stevens, alone, acknowledged that intentionally
sparing the condemned all pain in dying would undermine retribu-
tive justice, Justice Thomas, alone, acknowledged the possibility
that a state might intentionally inflict a painful death. "A method
of execution violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliber-
ately designed to inflict pain."62 Justice Thomas reviewed horrific
methods of execution the founding generation had definitely pro-
hibited by the Eighth Amendment, concluding "they were pur-
posely designed to inflict pain and suffering beyond that necessary
to cause death. ' '63 With no discussion of the inextricable connec-
tion between punishment and pain, the Justice declared flatly:
"[t]he evil the Eighth Amendment targets is intentional infliction
of gratuitous pain. "64 Everything else was permitted, including
easily avoidable risks of gratuitous pain, and reckless pain, haphaz-
ardly inflicted.
Not for a moment did Justice Thomas so much as consider
whether the intentionally inflicted painful death could ever be de-
served. To the contrary, "[b]ecause Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol is designed to eliminate pain rather than to inflict it," he
concluded, "petitioners' challenge must fail."' 65 The rest of the
Court remained silent, content to simply equate humaneness with
painlessness, and debate the constitutional limits of risking a pain-
ful death through a botched execution.
62. Id. at *32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
63. Id. at *33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
64. Id. at *35 (Thomas, J., concurring).
65. Id. at *39 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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IV. NEBRASKA OUTLAWS THE CHAIR
Many lethal injection states kept the electric chair as an option
for those originally sentenced to die that way.66 Nebraska, how-
ever, was the last state to designate electrocution as its exclusive
method of execution.67 On February 8, 2008, Nebraska's State Su-
preme Court in Nebraska v. Mato held the electric chair unconsti-
tutionally cruel and unusual, in violation of the state constitution.68
Nebraska had argued that the condemned "must show that the
Legislature intended to inflict unnecessary pain or a lingering
death. '69 Not so, the majority countered. There is "[n]o require-
ment to show [the] legislature intended to cause pain or lingering
death."70 At most "a prisoner must show two things: that there is
a significant risk of unnecessary pain during the execution and that
prison officials have been deliberately indifferent to that risk in de-
veloping an execution protocol."7
But even the state's indifference to a risk of pain was too much
to require before outlawing an execution method. The constitu-
tional prohibition of "wanton" pain in punishment required no cul-
pable attitude at all, the Nebraska high court flatly declared,
holding the state strictly liable for risks of unnecessary pain.7 2
"[W]anton means that the method itself is inherently cruel. We
believe that if a prisoner were required to show a legislature's mali-
cious intent in selecting a method of punishment, ... [no court]
would ever find any punishment to be unconstitutional. '73
In the fastidious newspeak of today's painless punishment, the
court assumed, without question or analysis, that the people's rep-
resentatives would never in anger or from moral conviction inten-
tionally inflict pain and suffering on a mass-murdering, sadistic
child killer. For the Nebraska Supreme Court, such purposeful
painful death would automatically constitute "malicious intent. '74
66. See TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS BULLETIN (U.S. Dept. of Just. Dec. 2006) (Table 2: Method of Execution, by
State, 2005).
67. Id. Seven states allow at least some inmates to choose the electric chair in-
stead of lethal injection. Two other states, Illinois and Oklahoma, have designated
electrocution as the fallback method should lethal injections be ruled unconstitu-
tional. Id.
68. See Nebraska v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 2008).
69. Id. at 265.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Lambert v. Buss, 498 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2007)).
72. Id. at 265.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Thus, "presum[ing] that the Legislature intended to select an exe-
cution method within constitutional bounds" the court "con-
clude[d] that whether the Legislature intended to cause pain in
selecting a punishment is irrelevant to a constitutional challenge.
7 5
Taken literally, this last declaration seems to show the court's
complete disregard of any state's intention to inflict pain. Under-
stood in context, however, it shows just the opposite. Even unin-
tentional infliction of pain could not be justified, precisely because
the state's intentional infliction of pain was unthinkable, inhumane,
and unconstitutional.
"Besides presenting a substantial risk of unnecessary pain, we
conclude that electrocution is unnecessarily cruel in its purposeless
infliction of physical violence," the court concluded. This again
begged the question:76 what if violence had a purpose? Perhaps
the condemned deserved it; perhaps it was necessary and just.
Upholding Utah's firing squad in 1879, the U.S. Supreme Court
famously declared it "safe to affirm" that the 8th Amendment for-
bade "punishments of torture.. . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty."' 77 Repeating this while upholding electrocu-
tion in 1890, the Court in Kemmler had prohibited a "lingering
death. ' 78 One hundred eighteen years later, outlawing electrocu-
tion, the Nebraska court specifically held that fifteen to thirty
seconds of intense pain was unconstitutionally lingering. 79 They
also cited "a lingering odor of burning flesh in the death cham-
ber."80 What must not linger? The experience of pain to the con-
demned? The biological process of dying, separate from the
conscious experience of any pain? Or, perhaps the victim's appar-
ent suffering must not linger in the memory of those witnessing it.
In sum, the Nebraska court held that separate from preventing a
risk of pain and suffering as he died, the state must minimize
"physical violence and mutilation of the prisoner's body," whether
or not intentional, whether or not the prisoner was conscious.81
Thus, the Nebraska court located cruelty not only in the experience
of the condemned, but also in the appearance of dying painfully,
and the lingering after effects on the witnesses.
75. Id. at 266.
76. Id. at 278.
77. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879) (emphasis added).
78. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
79. Mata v. State, 745 N.W.2d 229, 272 (Neb. 2008).
80. Id. at 269.
81. Id. at 266.
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V. BECCARIA AND BAZE
A month before Nebraska outlawed its electric chair, in oral ar-
guments in Baze, the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court also wres-
tled with lingering appearances and realities. Whereas the
Nebraska high court cited scientific evidence that dying contrac-
tions or quivers in the chair might well indicate excruciating and
unconstitutional pain, with lethal injection, the anesthetic when
properly injected renders the condemned unconscious and impervi-
ous to all pain.82 Dying quivers that those chemicals produced
would falsely appear painful, while in no way symptomatic of a
painful death. On the other hand, if the state improperly adminis-
tered an anesthetic, and followed it with a paralytic agent painful in
itself, this combination would produce but mask real pain and suf-
fering which the condemned, now paralyzed, would experience but
could not publicly express. 83 He would die apparently peacefully
while really suffering.
Twenty-five hundred years ago, the sophists insisted that appear-
ance was reality. Rejecting this, Plato emphasized the reality be-
neath appearances." Oddly, much of the controversy over painful
punishment replays this ancient controversy: the debate today re-
volves not only around how the condemned actually experiences
his painful punishment, but also how the pain appears to the ob-
server. When it comes to lethal pain and suffering, must appear-
ance match reality? Does the Constitution demand truth in dying?
Nothing could be more perverse and unjust to a true utilitarian
than pancuronium causing the condemned to suffer an agonizing
death, all the while appearing peaceful.
Classic utilitarians insist that rationally structured punishment
should most effectively deter others while least injuring the crimi-
nal by appearing much more painful than it feels. Thus, Beccaria
thoroughly rejected capital punishment itself, embracing instead
82. See Brief for the American Society of Anesthesiologists as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 5, Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259 (U.S.
Apr. 16, 2008) ("There is no medical dispute that a massive or superclinical dose of
thiopental (as those being considered by the courts), if effectively delivered into the
circulation, will reliably produce prolonged and deep unconsciousness.").
83. See generally Brief for Anesthesia Awareness Campaign, Inc. as Amicus Cu-
riae Supporting Neither Party at 4-6, Baze, 2008 WL 1733259 (describing anesthesia
awareness, the phenomenon of being mentally alert while supposedly being under full
anesthesia, and how the use of neuromuscular blockers make it impossible to signal
their awareness).
84. See, e.g., PLATO, PHAEDO (R. Hackforth trans., The Liberal Arts Press 1960)
(1952) [hereinafter PLATO, PHAEDO]; PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 2d ed. 1968).
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life in prison, hard labor, or "slavery," as "more terrible to the
spectator than to the sufferer himself. '85 We do well, utilitarians
insist, to perpetuate the myth of prison, and death row as "living
hell." Imagining prison life as intolerably harsh, law abiding citi-
zens would project their own delicate sensibilities into a hardened
criminal. "For the spectator considers the sum of all his wretched
moments," Beccaria explained, "whilst the sufferer, by the misery
of the present, is prevented from thinking of the future. ' 86 All
evils are increased by the imagination," he continued, "and the suf-
ferer finds resources and consolations, of which the spectators are
ignorant, who judge by their own sensibility of what passes in a
mind, by habit grown callous to misfortune.
87
Punishment, then, should never be more painful than it appears.
To the contrary, all punishment, including death, should appear
much more painful to observers than it feels to criminals, because
as Beccaria explained, "the severity of punishment [is] intended
more for them than for the criminal. '88
The state's good motives, to spare witnesses discomforting ap-
pearances, may justify risking actual pain to the condemned, ex-
plained Chief Justice Roberts for the plurality in Baze, upholding
Kentucky's right to administer the paralytic agent precisely be-
cause the state has "an interest in preserving the dignity of the pro-
cedure, especially where convulsions or seizures could be
misperceived as signs of consciousness or distress."8 9
While opponents of the paralytic agent would tolerate falsely
painful appearances, as a price worth paying for a guaranteed pain-
less, although extended, death, the Chief Justice insisted that "dig-
nity" might justify a real risk of painful death in order to avoid a
messy looking painless one. This would have seemed very strange
to Beccaria.
Classic utilitarians sought false appearances of pain: "The degree
of the punishment and the consequences of a crime, ought to be so
contrived, as to have the greatest possible effect on others, with the
least possible pain to the delinquent."90 Bentham took the appear-
ance-reality gap to its logical conclusion, proposing that the gov-
85. BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 109.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 107.
89. Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259 at *13 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008).
90. BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 79.
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ernment stage phony hangings, actually sparing the condemned.91
Let the public be conned.
Perversely, with too little barbiturate injected initially, the para-
lytic agent will cause the very agony it obscures.92 Rather than
seem worse than it feels, botched executions may feel much worse
than they seem. Thus, today's utilitarians, following Beccaria and
Bentham, should relentlessly attack the current regime.
Witnesses whom the Chief Justice would protect from false ap-
pearances of pain would usually include victims' family members
choosing to watch their loved-ones' killer die, probably deriving
comfort from believing, however falsely, that their child's rapist
murderer died a painful death. If we give greater priority to vic-
tim's survivors than other witnesses, we might owe them real solace
from the killer's apparent suffering.
And what of the victim himself? Suppose retributivists commit
themselves to keep covenants with the past. As Adam Smith
points out, we place ourselves in the dead victim's shoes, imagining
his righteous satisfaction at witnessing his murderer's fate.93
Ultimately, then, for retributivists, false appearances will not do.
By tradition, retributivists believed that Socrates, wrongly con-
demned, at least died painlessly by hemlock. Now scientists inform
us that hemlock contains properties similar to pancuronium, 94 leav-
ing us pained to contemplate that this great and good man may
have died in an agony obscured from his disciples. Ironically, for
all his faith in a knowable objective reality underlying appearance,
Plato himself, may have been deceived here by the apparent seren-
ity of his beloved mentor's death.95
The paralytic agent should not be employed to mask pain;
neither should the initial anesthetic alone be allowed to produce its
false appearance. If a killer deserves a quick but painful death, we
deserve the satisfaction of knowing he experiences it. If most con-
91. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: PRINCI-
PLES OF PENAL LAW pt. II, bk. I, ch. V (William Tait ed., 1843), available at http://oll.
libertyfund.org/title/2009/139816.
92. See Brief for the American Society of Anesthesiologists, supra note 82, at 6-7.
93. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 82 (Knud Haakon-
ssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
94. See Thomas Laarson, Some History and Effects of Conium Maculatum L
(Uppsala Univ. 2004) at 25, available at http://www.fkog.uu.se/course/essays/conium-
maculatum.pdf (describing effects of hemlock); J. Higa de Landon, Conium Macu-
latum L (Univ. of Buenos Aires), http://www.inchem.org/documents/pims/plant/co-
nium.htm (last visited May 7, 2008) (describing effects of hemlock).
95. See PLATO, PHAEDO, supra note 84 (compare this description with that cited in
footnote 94).
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demned killers deserve to die, but without pain, we commit a great
injustice by creating false appearances that obscure their wrongly
inflicted, unjustly suffered pain.
VI. "THIs Is AN EXECUTION, NOT SURGERY"196
Lethal injection's most pernicious false appearance of all, what
condemns it if nothing else does, is the medical illusion. Through
painstaking research, repeatedly cited by the Supreme Court in
Baze,97 Professor Deborah Denno has unmasked recent tradition,
forcing the origins of this execution method into conscious mem-
ory.98 Haphazardly conceived and hastily designed by two
Oklahoma doctors under pressure to suggest a "medically hu-
mane," 99 aesthetically pleasing method of killing, lethal injection so
nearly resembles a medical procedure that controversy swells to-
day whether doctors and other trained medical personnel are nec-
essary and proper for painless executions. 100
During oral argument in Baze, the state conflated punishment
with medicine: "Kentucky uses what is probably literally the best
qualified human being in the Commonwealth," insisted Roy En-
glert, counsel for the state.101 "It uses a phlebotomist who in her
daily job works with the prison population."'01 2 "It's someone like
the person who inserts an IV in a hospital. The experts in this case
all agreed that in a hospital setting IVs are not inserted by medical
doctors, they are inserted by phlebotomists. ' ' 10 3 How perversely
ironic, that Kentucky's counsel would employ hospital imagery to
prove doctors unnecessary for the first stage of lethal injection.
The American Medical Association officially condemns it, and
many physicians agree that doctors who participate in executions
violate the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm. 104 A doctor should
not medically kill a patient in the service of the state. Some physi-
96. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 16.
97. See generally Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259 (U.S. Apr. 16,
2008).
98. Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dis-
mantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (2007).
99. Id. at 59.
100. Id. at 65-66, 84-88.
101. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 27.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 28.
104. AM. MED. Ass'N., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, E-2.06: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf new/pf-online (enter "e-2.06" into "Enter search
term" field and click on "Search", follow "E-2.06 Capital Punishment" hyperlink)
(last visited May 7, 2008).
988 [Vol. XXXV
KILLING THEM SOFTLY
cians counter that as long as the state will kill the condemned any-
way, a trained physician should mercifully diminish his suffering.
"I argue that it is honorable for physicians to minimize the harm to
these condemned individuals and that organized medicine has an
obligation to permit physician participation in legal execution,"
Doctor David Waisel insisted in a recent exchange. 10 5 "By partici-
pation, I mean to the extent necessary to ensure a good death." 106
"Physicians are permitted to let people die," Waisel observed,
"such as in the withdrawal or withholding of care. Physicians are
even permitted to be a proximate cause of death, in the sense that
sometimes the medications needed to treat pain and discomfort un-
intentionally hasten death.10 7
Unintentionally? Too many of us have gone through it: family
members riddled with inoperable terminal cancer, wracked with
pain, grieving loved ones suffering with them, finally helped to die
by morphine drip at a hospital or hospice. Medical personnel clini-
cally justify this lethal dose as the least necessary to ease the pa-
tient's excruciating pain and suffering. But make no mistake about
it: these angels of mercy-doctors and nurses-through an IV line,
knowingly administer that lethal dose of painkiller.
Here, medical personnel have acted in the best interests of the
patient and family. With execution by lethal injection, however,
Dr. Waisel observed that we may "legitimate[ly] question whether
the physician is acting as a tool of the individual [patient] to mini-
mize suffering and further [the patient's] goals or whether the phy-
sician is acting as a tool of the government to ensure a successful
execution."1 0 8
Historically, doctors did quarantine infectious patients, depriving
them of liberty, perhaps against their individual best interests, but
to serve society.'0 9 "But," Dr. Waisel cautioned, "physician partici-
pation in capital punishment provides no societal health bene-
fit."" 0 Of course, retributivist death penalty supporters profoundly
disagree. The health of the body politic fundamentally rests on do-
ing justice. But perhaps we stray here from the medical to the
metaphorical.
105. David Waisel, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 82 MAYO CLINIC
PROC. 1073 (2007).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1075.
108. Id. at 1076.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Ultimately, "although the outcome may be death," Dr. Waisel
concluded his analysis, the physician assisting an execution acts
"solely to provide comfort."'' 1 Thus, that physician acts not as "a
tool of the government; he is acting as a physician whose goals tem-
porarily align with the goals of the government. ' 112 Once again,
the actor's motive to diminish pain would legitimize the deadly act.
Commenting on this, Dr. Mark Heath, a death penalty opponent
and leading anesthesiologist, dissected current lethal injection pro-
tocols. Inserting the IV line and introducing the anesthetic do have
medical and therapeutic purposes, he observed, but injecting the
pancuronium solely "to produce cosmetic paralysis," and then ad-
ministering potassium to stop the heart and kill the condemned
"are not performed with therapeutic intent" and therefore, "they
are not medical procedures.""1 3 Thus, he concluded, "lethal injec-
tion is concurrently both a medical and a non-medical
procedure. "114
Of course, if counsel for the condemned had their way in Baze,
the Court would have commanded states to discontinue the para-
lytic agent, along with the heart-stopping potassium, relying on a
single lethal dose of -the anesthetic thiopental. Then what? "If
thiopental were the only drug administered, it would not be serving
an anesthetic function; instead," observed Dr. Heath, "it would be
functioning to cause death by apnea."' 15
If states were to eliminate the paralytic agent and lethal heart
stopper, finding the vein and injecting the deadly dose of anesthetic
would now be strictly punitive, and no longer medical. One could
argue then, although Dr. Heath does not, doctors would not be
necessary. The entire execution procedure would be pure punish-
ment and not medical at all. Arguably, too, doctors could, if they
volunteered, properly participate not as doctors, but rather as citi-
zen executioners, just as they could serve on firing squads, because
in neither case would they be administering deadly medicine in the
name of the state.
States, however, should not allow this. Whether strictly medical
or not, lethal injection resembles, appears, feels, and seems medi-
cal. Ironically, by eliminating the paralytic agent along with the
111. Id. at 1077.
112. Id.
113. Mark Heath, Revisiting Physician Involvement in Capital Punishment: Medical
and Nonmedical Aspects of Lethal Injection, 83 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 115, 116 (2008).
114. Id. at 115.
115. Id. at 116.
990 [Vol. XXXV
KILLING THEM SOFTLY
heart-stopping potassium-even as we make it non-medical-we
make it appear more medical.
We are thrown back, again, to appearances.
"[W]e propose that physicians and their drugs should be physi-
cally, philosophically, and symbolically removed from the execu-
tion suites," doctors William Lanier and Keith Berge declared in
the Mayo Clinic proceedings, sharply disagreeing with Dr.
Waisel. 116 "Instead, they should be replaced by personnel and
tools that are clearly representative of the legal system and clearly
distinguished from representing medical care. "117
"The image of physician as executioner under circumstances
mimicking medical care risks the general trust of the public," the
American Medical Association has officially warned, firmly oppos-
ing all doctor participation in lethal injections.118 The vast majority
of doctors agree.
Are doctors necessarily and properly involved in lethal injec-
tion? Can we eliminate pain and the substantial risk of pain with
or without physicians and without compromising other values? By
demanding doctor participation in order to help ensure a painless
death, do we, as the American Medical Association insists, contam-
inate the public image of medicine?
Opponents rightly reject lethal injection as essentially and sym-
bolically flawed. The condemned dies in a gurney, wrapped in
white sheets with an IV in his veins, surrounded by his closest kin,
monitored by sophisticated medical devices. The whole setting ap-
pears medicinal, although it aims solely to kill. Witnessing Benny
Demps' execution by lethal injection in Florida, I shuddered at my
associations with hospital and hospice. How we kill those we
rightly detest should in no way resemble how we kill or euthanize
beloved parents or pets.
Almost everybody opposes physician participation as either un-
necessary or improper. And yet, perhaps because they have un-
consciously embraced the ideal of a painless execution, almost
everybody looks to medicine for guidance as to how we should exe-
cute. In Baze, for example, Justice Stevens found the use of
pancuronium "particularly disturbing because.., it serves no ther-
116. William L. Lanier & Keith H. Berge, Physician Involvement in Capital Punish-
ment: Simplifying a Complex Calculus, 82 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1043, 1046 (2007).
117. Id.
118. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Physi-
cian Participation in Capital Punishment, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 365, 366 (1993).
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apeutic purpose."' 119 Citing practices in the Netherlands "where
physician-assisted euthanasia is permitted,"' 120 Justice Roberts up-
held the use of the paralytic agent.12' Justice Breyer concurred,
also citing Dutch medical practices in assisting suicide. 122
Just as we do not look to medical therapists to tell us whom to
execute, so too medicine should no more tell us how. Today's regi-
men delivers poison to the heart solely to kill the condemned. This
last phase clearly constitutes punishment and cannot be confused
with medicine. Eliminate that deadly poison, painful in itself, and
we obliterate the last clear line between treating the sick and pun-
ishing the heinous.
Punishment and medicine should never resemble each other, al-
though in the sixth century B.C., Heraclitus paradoxically ob-
served that doctors cut and burn us and we pay them for it.123 We
still conflate the punitive and palliative colloquially when we ad-
monish the brave criminal to "take his medicine." But now, with
anesthesia, medicine need no longer be inherently painful, whereas
punishment must be.
Lethal injection, however, unconscionably merges punishment
with treatment. It bears re-emphasizing: How we kill those we
condemn should in no way resemble how we kill those we care for.
Doctors should not participate in executions, the standard argu-
ment goes, lest the public associate medicine with killing. We, too,
condemn lethal injection as a method of execution, not only be-
cause it contaminates medicine by apparently employing medicine
as punishment, but also because it cosmetizes and contaminates
punishment by anesthetically medicalizing it.
After all, as Justice Scalia declared during oral argument in Baze,
"this is an execution, not surgery. '124
VII. CONCLUSION: KILLING THEM SOFTLY
"Can pain, which is a sensation, have any connection with a
moral sentiment?'1 2 5 Beccaria answered "No," but at least he ex-
plicitly raised that question which every official participant in the
debate today seems either to miss, assume away, or avoid.
119. Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259, at *13 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008)
120. Id. at *14.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *41 (Breyer, J., concurring).
123. HERACLITUS, HERACLITUS: TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS 25 § 58 (Dennis
Sweet trans., Univ. Press of America, Inc. 1995).
124. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 42, at 16.
125. BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 44.
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The vast majority of us would insist that nurses, psychoanalysts,
and ministers act morally by alleviating pain. Can we not act mor-
ally, also, by inflicting pain? Retributivists say yes.
Most opponents and many death penalty supporters may think it
macabre or sadistic ever to advocate painful death, much less to
attempt to calibrate it: retributivists may legitimately argue for the
punishment of a deserved death, abolitionists may concede, but
surely no decent person could urge the painful punishment of dy-
ing. Pain and anguish must to some degree accompany punish-
ment, they admit, but humane persons never use physical pain as
an instrument of justice.
Emotive retributivists do connect pain with moral sentiments.
Pain that the killer intentionally caused the victim later gives us
just cause to bring pain upon him: "Retribution" comes from the
Latin, literally "pay back. ' ' 126 The dictionary defines retribution as
"deserved punishment for evil done, or, sometimes, reward for
good done; merited requital.' 1 27 Pain deserved cannot erase the
harm, but it can help restore a balance.
We retributivists understand how appalled others feel to read
this, but we, too, feel certain intuitively - not rationally, but really
certain. Probably most of humankind shares this moral intuition
that punishment must be painful to be punishment, and sometimes
too, punishment must be very painful to be just.
If the U.S. Supreme Court someday outlaws pancuronium and
potassium, then simply killing by a massive dose of lethal anes-
thetic would truly emancipate physical pain from punishment.
Then it might seem as though Beccaria and other utilitarians, who
condemn unnecessary pain, have won. But although Beccaria
makes no mention of our rightful satisfaction at doing justice, expi-
ation, or restoring balance to the world, this abolitionist patron-
saint affirmatively called for non-lethal, but bodily, painful punish-
ment above prison's total deprivation of liberty. "Some crimes re-
late to person, others to property," Beccaria declared.12 8 "The first
ought to be punished corporally.'
112 9
Rejecting capital punishment absolutely, Beccaria necessarily re-
jected a painful punishment of death. He did advocate, however,
state-imposed, non-capital, painful punishment as a proper re-
126. See, e.g., MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at
947.
127. Id.
128. See BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 82.
129. Id.
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sponse to crime. Consequently, the criminal and society would as-
sociate pain with crime and forego criminal temptation. 130 When
the condemned himself has intentionally tortured helpless victims
to death, how better to preserve some analogical connection short
of torture than by that murderer's quick but painful death?
Of course, as Beccaria observes and Justice Stevens has echoed
in Baze, a person's capacity to withstand unpleasant sensations lim-
its our capacity to punish: "Ingenious cruelty multiplies the variety
of torments, yet the human frame can suffer only to a certain de-
gree, beyond which it is impossible to go, be the enormity of the
crime ever so great."' 31
The Eighth Amendment outlaws torture as punishment. While
pain may be limited by a human being's physical capacity to absorb
it, our commitment to human dignity constitutionally limits justifia-
bly painful punishment, to what a humane body politic can bear.
Baze's challenge made it to the U.S. Supreme Court. Michael
Morales' stayed lethal injection in California, however, really
helped launch this intense scrutiny. 3 Michael Morales volun-
teered to do a favor for a cousin, who was jealous of his bisexual
lover's girlfriend.'33 He carefully planned and rehearsed how to
use a belt to strangle Terri Winchell, seventeen, by all accounts a
lovely girl, who sang in the church choir and saw the best in peo-
ple.' But the belt broke as Terri struggled for her life, tearing out
her own hair in the process. 135 So Morales grabbed a claw hammer
and beat her twenty-three times, ripping the flesh from her face. 136
Then, feeling it "a shame to waste a good piece of ass," Morales
dragged this beautiful innocent girl, face-down across a road and
into a vineyard, where he stripped off her clothing and raped
her. 37 Then he stabbed her four times in the heart, stealing eleven
dollars which he spent, celebrating that night on beer, wine, and
cigarettes. 38
130. See id. at 79.
131. Id. at 102.
132. Louis Sahagun & Tim Reiterman, Execution of Killer-Rapist is Delayed; Prison
Warden Wanted More Time to Train the Doctors Who Were to Monitor the Procedure
to Ensure that Michael Morales Felt No Pain, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006.
133. People v. Morales, 770 P.2d 244, 249-50 (Cal. 1989).
134. See Sahagun & Reiterman, supra note 132; Cal. Office of Victim Servs., People
v. Michael Angelo Morales: Background Information, Feb. 2006.
135. See Sahagun & Reiterman, supra note 132.
136. See Morales, 770 P.2d at 270.
137. See Kevin Fagan, Love Triangle Gone Vicious, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2006.
138. See id.
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If lethal injection works as designed, Morales will die painlessly.
If the executioners botch it, this sadistic rapist murderer may feel
intense pain and burning as the paralytic agent courses through his
veins. He will suffer excruciating pain for a couple of minutes, un-
til the potassium stops his heart and kills him.
"Let us consult the human heart and there we shall find the
foundation of the sovereign's right to punish," Beccaria declared
tellingly. 139 Intuitively and emotionally, we feel certain we have
the right, if not the responsibility to painfully punish monsters such
as Morales, because they deserve it. We rightly hate, yes hate,
Morales and others like him.
Fitzjames Stephen, the great English judge and criminal law his-
torian detested vicious criminals, and declared it "highly desirable"
to design punishments "to give expression to that hatred. ' 140 Even
the great anti-retributivist, anti-pain utilitarian Beccaria, asserts the
intuitive basis for punishment. Beccaria claims the right to punish
painfully, but appropriately. Moral intuition dictates that some vi-
olent criminals deserved violent and painfully inflicted punishment.
Embracing human dignity as their primary value, retributivists
like Adam Smith emphasize "a humanity that is more generous
and comprehensive," and "oppos[ing] to the emotions of compas-
sion which they feel for a particular person, a more enlarged com-
passion which they feel for mankind. ' 141 Thus, unwarranted
"mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent. ' 142
Michael Morales may deserve more than he can physically toler-
ate. It would violate the Constitution, and our own human dignity,
to kill him as painfully as he deserves to die. Would it defile justice
and human dignity, however, to intentionally inflict upon him a
quick but painful death? Suppose Morales did not intend Terri
Winchell's prolonged suffering before she died. Suppose her feel-
ings never crossed his mind. Callous, cold, wanton, and depraved,
he did not care how she felt as he made her suffer a drawn out
agonizing death. If Morales acted with such callous disregard, de-
praved indifference to his helpless victim's excruciating pain, what
poetic justice, at least to risk inflicting a painful death with a
"botched" execution, displaying our own deliberate indifference.
Opponents may shrink in horror at these suggestions. But see
where their moral logic takes them, and us along with them. Sup-
139. See BECCARIA, supra note 11, at 19.
140. See STEPHEN, supra note 6, at 82.
141. See SMITH, supra note 93, at 104.
142. See id.
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pose we deny that justice ever requires a quick but painful death.
Dr. Waisel, in the Mayo Clinic Proceedings called for physician
participation to produce a "good death," by which he probably
meant pain-free. 143 The Jewish Lawyers' amicus brief in Baze took
it a step further, claiming Talmudic support for "the most beautiful
death possible. ' 144 What could this mean, practically? A recent
BBC documentary explored hypoxia: by breathing nitrogen, the
condemned would die in a state of euphoria.
145
Why then merely a painless death? Do we owe Michael Morales
and other sadistic rapist murderers a "beautiful death," an eu-
phoric death? A Glasgow TV critic called me, "the scariest man
I've ever seen on TV," for protesting that painless does not always
equal a humane death, and that some people deserve a quick but
painful death. 46
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in Furman, struck down the
death penalty across the U.S. as cruel because states so arbitrarily
and haphazardly administered it.147 Now we more carefully define
capital crimes, specifying aggravating circumstances. We also more
carefully select and instruct juries to balance the heinous crime
against the criminal's tragic upbringing, to reach an informed
moral decision as to whether the convicted murderer shall live or
die.
When it comes to actually administering death, however, pain-
lessly or not, decades later, arbitrariness continues. Such indiffer-
ence violates human dignity when exercised indiscriminately. How
unjust to equate Daryl Holton, who killed his children painlessly to
make certain they would no longer suffer, with sadists like Charles
Ng with his friend's basement torture chamber designed to make
his victims suffer.148
If we more nearly matched crime with punishment, we would
design a pain-free death for those who killed their victims pain-
lessly, while reserving a painful death for those who sadistically tor-
tured their victims. Between the extremes, psychopaths kill with a
143. See Waisel, supra note 105, at 1073
144. See Brief for the AAJCJ, supra note 18 (quoting Haim H. Cohn, Capital Pun-
ishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA Vol. 4, 446 (2d ed. 2007).
145. See Horizon: How to Kill a Human Being (BBC2 television broadcast Jan. 15,
2008).
146. See David Belcher, Portillo and the Ultimate Punishment, THE HERALD (Glas-
gow, Scot.), Jan. 16, 2008, at F2.
147. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
148. Dan Barry, Taking the Guilt out of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2007; Larry Hatfield, Ng Jury to Consider Sentence: Found Guilty in 11 Deaths; Jurors
Split on Death of S.F. Used Car Dealer, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 25, 1999, at A4.
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depraved indifference to any pain they might cause. For them and
them alone, perhaps, the present lethal injection regime with its
real risk of excruciating pain, otherwise easily avoided, may seem
an appropriate like-kind response. Of course, as society greatly
prefers to acquit the guilty than to convict the innocent, we should
err on the side of pain-free executions when we are uncertain what
the condemned deserves.
In the modern era, we have been shamed for desiring to inflict
pain. We send the condemned to live on death row for decades
administered by correction officers who keep things laid back, uni-
formly disavowing any mission to punish the worst of the worst.
Officers and inmates alike consider it bad form, unsolicited, even
to mention to the murderer the fate of his victims, to refer to the
killings that condemned him to die.
Then, after decades living on death row, when it comes time to
execute the condemned, by selecting a supposedly pain-free,
bureaucratized ritual, we further disembody their punishment of
death. No photographs or video of the victim appear in the death
chamber, no oral recounting the victim's pain, no mention of the
crime during the final execution scene.
In Panetti, recently reaffirming that a state may never execute an
insane killer, the U.S. Supreme Court insisted that the condemned
must be able to connect what he did to what we are about to do to
him. 14 9 Ironically, from condemnation to execution, today's "en-
lightened progressives" subvert that same concern, by severing
crime from punishment, for participants and observers. Finally, we
sever punishment from pain, except for botched executions where
we keep that connection but make it entirely haphazard, and in no
way connected to justice. Refusing even to contemplate intention-
ally distinguishing those few who deserve to die a quick but painful
death, instead states seem quite willing to randomly expose all the
condemned to an undifferentiated risk of excruciating pain.
The time has come to reaffirm the inseparable connection of
crime with punishment, and punishment with pain. Let us reject
our self-administered disembodied anesthetic that saturates the
whole process with an abstract sense of shame, and a numbing de-
personalized air.150 Face what we do, and acknowledge, with regret
but without shame, that by executing a helpless human being, we
keep covenants with the past.
149. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2847 (2007).
150. See ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WORK (Roy Roberg ed., Brooks/Cole Publish-
ing Co. 1990).
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However objectionable in its effect, pancuronium acts as our
perfect metaphor: it paralyzes all, severing emotions, severing the
crime, disconnecting us from what we do, and why. We cannot see
the executioner hidden in his private chamber behind a one-way
mirror as he administers the paralytic agent or lethal drug. We dis-
able the condemned from crying out in pain. We cannot hear him,
and simply cannot bear responsibility for his death, even as we kill
him. Responsibility, anger rests everywhere else.
The paralytic agent paralyzes us. The anesthetic anesthetizes us
too.
Solon, the ancient lawgiver, declared that "in a well-governed
state, citizens like members of the same body, should feel and re-
sent each other's injuries. ' 151 Yet we kill the condemned without
pleasure, or pain, as if we must, without showing what we feel, if
we feel at all.
So in the end, again, we retributivists, too, condemn lethal injec-
tion as the method of execution, not because it possibly causes
pain, but because it certainly causes confusion, arbitrarily merging
punishment and treatment, arbitrarily severing crime from punish-
ment, pain from justice.
Justice Stevens had hoped that the Court's decision in Baze
"would bring the debate about lethal injection as a method of exe-
cution to a close. ' 152 This retributivist hopes that as executions re-
sume and litigation continues, a real debate about pain and
punishment may yet begin.
151. Attributed to Solon, the ancient Greek law giver. See ROBERT J. BONNER,
LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 60 (WM. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1994) (1927).
152. Baze v. Rees, No. 07-5439, 2008 WL 1733259, at *21 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2008) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
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